This paper defines an argumentation semantics for extended logic programming and shows its equivalence to the well-founded semantics with explicit negation. We set up a general framework in which we extensively compare this semantics to other argumentation semantics, including those of Dung, and Prakken and Sartor. We present a general dialectical proof theory for these argumentation semantics.
Introduction
Argumentation has attracted much interest in the area of AI. On the one hand, argumentation is an important way of human interaction and reasoning, and is therefore of interest for research into intelligent systems. Application areas include automated negotiation via argumentation [15, 14, 18] and legal reasoning [17] . On the other hand, argumentation provides a formal model for various assumption based (or non-monotonic, or default) reasoning formalisms [4, 5] . In particular, various argumentation based semantics have been proposed for logic programming with default negation [4, 7] .
Argumentation semantics are elegant since they can be captured in an abstract framework [7, 4, 20, 12] , for which an elegant theory of attack, defence, acceptability, and other notions can be developed, without recourse to the concrete instance of the reasoning formalism at hand. This framework can then be instantiated to various assumption based reasoning formalisms. Similarly, a dialectical proof theory, based on dialogue trees, can be defined for an abstract argumentation framework, and then applied to any instance of such a framework [7, 11] .
In general, an argument A is a proof which may use a set of defeasible assumptions. Another argument B may have a conclusion which contradicts the assumptions or the conclusions of A, and thereby B attacks A. There are two fundamental notions of such attacks: undercut and rebut [17] or equivalently ground-attack and reductio-ad-absurdum attack [6] . We will use the terminology of undercuts and rebuts. Both attacks differ in that an undercut attacks a premise of an argument, while a rebut attacks a conclusion.
Given a logic program we can define an argumentation semantics by iteratively collecting those arguments which are acceptable to a proponent, i.e. they can be defended against all opponent attacks. In fact, such a notion of acceptability can be defined in a number of ways depending on which attacks we allow the proponent and opponent to use.
Normal logic programs do not have negative conclusions, which means that we cannot use rebuts. Thus both opponents can only launch undercuts on each other's assumptions. Various argumentation semantics have been defined for normal logic programs [4, 7, 13] , some of which are equivalent to existing semantics such as the stable model semantics [9] or the well-founded semantics [8] .
Extended logic programs [10, 2, 21] , on the other hand, introduce explicit negation, which states that a literal is explicitly false. As a result, both undercuts and rebuts are possible forms of attack; there are further variations depending on whether any kind of counterattack is admitted. A variety of argumentation semantics arise if one allows one notion of attack as defence for the proponent, and another as attack for the opponent. Various argumentation semantics have been proposed for extended logic programs [6, 17] . Dung has shown that a certain argumentation semantics is equivalent to the answer set semantics [10] , a generalisation of the stable model semantics [9] . To our knowledge, no argumentation semantics has yet been found equivalent to the well-founded semantics for extended logic programs, WFSX [16, 2] . This paper makes the following contributions: we define a least fixpoint argumentation semantics for extended logic programs, and show its equivalence to the well-founded semantics with explicit negation [16, 2, 1] . In order to relate this semantics to other argumentation semantics, we set up a general framework to classify notions of justified arguments, and use it to compare our argumentation semantics to those of Dung [6] and Prakken and Sartor [17] among others. We develop a general dialectical proof theory for the notions of justified arguments we introduce.
The paper is organised as follows: First we define arguments and notions of attack and acceptability. Then we set up a framework for classifying different least fixpoint argumentation semantics, based on different notions of attack. In Section 4, we recall the definition of WFSX, and in Section 5, we prove the equivalence of an argumentation semantics and WFSX. A general dialectical proof theory for arguments is presented in Section 6, and its soundness and completeness is proven.
Extended Logic Programming and Argumentation
We summarise the definitions of arguments for extended logic programs, and define various notions of attack between arguments.
Arguments
Definition 
For such a rule r, we call L 0 the head of the rule, head(r), and L 1 , . . . , not L m+n the body of the rule, body(r).
Our definition of an argument for an extended logic program is based on [17] . Essentially, an argument is a partial proof, resting on a number of assumptions, i.e. a set of default literals. In [4, 6] , an argument is a set of assumptions; the two approaches are equivalent in that there is an argument with Note that we do not consider priorities of arguments, as used e.g. in [17, 20] . The restriction to minimal arguments is not essential, but convenient, since it rules out arguments constructed from several unrelated arguments. Generally, one is interested in the conclusions of an argument, and wants to avoid having rules in an argument which do not contribute to the desired conclusion.
Notions of Attack
There are two fundamental notions of attack: undercut, which invalidates an assumption of an argument, and rebut, which contradicts a conclusion of an argument [6, 17] . From these, we may define further notions of attack, by allowing either of the two fundamental kinds of attack, and considering whether any kind of counter-attack is allowed or not. We will now formally define these notions of attacks. The notions of undercut and rebut, and hence attack are fundamental for extended logic programs [6, 17] . The notion of defeat is used in [17] , along with a notion of strict defeat, i.e. a defeat that is not counterdefeated. For arguments without priorities, rebuts are symmetrical, and therefore strict defeat coincides with strict undercut, i.e. an undercut that is not counterundercut. Similarly, strict attack coincides with strict undercut. For this reason, we use the term strong undercut instead of strict undercut, and similarly define strong attack to be an attack which is not counterundercut. We will use the following abbreviations for these notions of attack. r for rebuts, u for undercuts, a for attacks, d for defeats, sa for strongly attacks, and su for strongly undercuts.
Definition 3 Let
These notions of attack define for any extended logic program a binary relation on the set of arguments of that program.
Definition 4 A notion of attack is a function x which assigns to each extended logic program P a binary relation x P on the set of arguments of P , i.e. x P ⊆ Args 2 P . Notions of attack can be partially ordered by defining x ⊆ y iff ∀P : x P ⊆ y P Definition 5 Let x be a notion of attack. Then the inverse of x, denoted by x −1 , is defined as x
In this relational notation, Definition 3 can be rewrit-
Using the set-theoretic laws A−B ⊆ A ⊆ A∪C and (A∪B)−C = (A−C)∪(B−C) (for all sets A, B, and C), it is easy to see that the notions of attack of Definition 3 are partially ordered according to the following Hasse diagram.
This diagram contains the notions of attack used in [6, 17] , plus strongly attacks which seemed a natural intermediate notion between strongly undercuts and defeats. We have not included rebuts, because in the absence of priorities, rebuts is somewhat weaker than undercuts, because it is symmetric: a rebut is always counter-rebutted, while the same does not hold for undercuts.
Acceptability and Justified Arguments
Given the above notions of attack, we define acceptability of an argument. Basically, an argument is acceptable if it can be defended against any attack. Depending on which particular notion of attack we use as defence and which for the opponent's attacks, we obtain a host of acceptability notions.
Acceptability forms the basis for our argumentation semantics, which is defined as the least fixpoint of a function, which collects all acceptable arguments. The least fixpoint is of particular interest [17, 6] , because it provides a canonical fixpoint semantics and it can be constructed inductively.
Definition 6 Let x and y be notions of attack. Let A be an argument, and S a set of arguments. Then
A is x/y-acceptable wrt. S if for every argument B such that (B, A) ∈ x there exists an argument C ∈ S such that (C, B) ∈ y.
Based on the notion of acceptability, we can then define a fixpoint semantics for arguments.
Definition 7 Let x and y be notions of attack, and P an extended logic program. The operator F P,x/y : P(Args P ) → P(Args P ) is defined as
We denote the least fixpoint of F P,x/y by J P,x/y . If the program P is clear from the context, we omit the subscript P . An argument A is called x/y-justified if A ∈ J x/y ; an argument is called x/y-overruled if it is attacked by an x/y-justified argument; and an argument is called x/y-defensible if it is neither x/yjustified nor x/y-overruled.
For any program P , the least fixpoint exists by the Knaster-Tarski fixpoint theorem [19, 3] , because F P,x/y is monotone. It can be constructed by transfinite induction as follows:
for λ a limit ordinal Then there exists a least ordinal λ 0 such that
Relationships of Notions of Justifiability
This section is devoted to an analysis of the relationship between the different notions of justifiability, leading to a hierarchy of notions of justifiability illustrated in Figure 2 .
First of all, it is easy to see that the least fixpoint increases if we weaken the attacks, or strengthen the defence.
Theorem 2 states that it does not make a difference if we allow only the strong version of the defence. This is because an argument need not defend itself on its own, but it may rely on other arguments to defend it.
We only give a formal proof for the first theorem; the proofs for the other theorems are similar, and we provide an intuitive informal explanation instead. Proof. Informally, every x-attack B to an x/yjustified argument A is y-defended by some x/syjustified argument C (by induction). Now if C was not a sy-attack, then it is undercut by B, and because x ⊇ undercuts and C is justified, there exists a strong defence for C against B, which is also a defence of the original argument A against C. In particular, the previous Theorem states that undercut and strong undercut are equivalent as a defence, as are attack and strong attack. This may be useful in an implementation, where we may use the stronger notion of defence without changing the semantics, thereby decreasing the number of arguments to be checked. The following Corollary shows that because defeat lies between attack and strong attack, it is equivalent to both as a defence.
Corollary 3 Let x be a notion of attack such that
Proof. With Proposition 1 and Theorem 2, we have
Theorem 4 Let x be a notion of attack such that x ⊇ strongly attacks. Then
Proof. Every x-attack B to a x/a-justified argument a is attacked by some x/u-justified argument C (by induction). If C is a rebut, but not an undercut, then because B strongly attacks C, and because x ⊇ strongly attacks, there must have been an argument defending C by undercutting B, thereby also defending A against B.
The statement for defeats follows in a similar way to Corollary 3.
The proof is similar to Theorem 4.
Proof. Every strong undercut B to a su/a-justified argument A is attacked by some su/d-justified argument C (by induction). If C does not defeat A, then there is some argument D defending C by defeating B, thereby also defending A against B. 2
We will now present some example programs which distinguish various notions of justifiability. Example 2 Consider P 2 in Figure 1 . Let x be a notion of attack. Then J d/x = J a/x = ∅, because every argument is defeated (hence attacked).
is the only argument which is not strongly attacked, but it does not strongly attack any other argument. Example 3 Consider P 3 in Figure 1 . Let x be a notion of attack. Then J sa/x = ∅, because every argument is strongly attacked. 
Example 4 Consider P 4 in Figure 1 . Let x be a notion of attack. Then Figure 1 . Then J a/x = ∅, because both arguments attack each other, while
Example 6 Consider P 6 in Figure 1 . Let x be a notion of attack. Then Figure 2 .
because every argument is strongly attacked (hence defeated and attacked), while
J u/x = J su/x = {[p], [q]}.
Theorem 7 The notions of justifiability are ordered (by set inclusion) according to the Hasse diagram in
y y y y y y y p p p p p
y y y y y y p p p p p By definition, Dung's grounded argumentation semantics [6] is exactly a/u-justifiability, while Prakken and Sartor's semantics [17] , if we disregard priorities, amounts to d/su-justifiability. As corollaries to Theorem 7, we obtain relationships of these semantics to the other notions of justifiability. [6] . Then J Dung = J a/su = J a/u = J a/a = J a/d = J a/sa and J Dung ⊆ J x/y for all notions of attack x and y. [17] , where all arguments have the same priority. Then
Corollary 8 Let J Dung be the set of justified arguments according to Dung's grounded argumentation semantics

Corollary 9 Let J P S be the set of justified arguments according to Prakken and Sartor's argumentation semantics
for all notions of attack x = a and y, and J P S ⊇ J a/y for all notions of attack y. [16, 2] in the following section.
Well-founded semantics
We recollect the definition of the well-founded semantics for extended logic programs, WFSX. We use the definition of [1] , because it is closer to our definition of argumentation semantics than the original definition of [16, 2] .
Definition 8 The set of all objective literals of a program P is called the Herbrand base of P and denoted by H(P ). A pseudo-interpretation of a program P is a set T ∪ not F where T and F are subsets of H(P ). An interpretation is a pseudo-interpretation where the sets T and F are disjoint. An interpretation is called two-valued if T ∪ F = H(P ).
Definition 9 Let P be an extended logic program, I
an interpretation, and let P ′ (resp. I ′ ) be obtained from P (resp. I) by replacing every literal ¬A by a new atom, say ¬ A. The GL-transformation 
Definition 10
The semi-normal version of a program P is the program P s obtained from P by replacing every rule L ← Body in P by the rule L ← not ¬L, Body.
If the program P is clear from the context, we write ΓI for Γ P I and Γ s I for Γ Ps I.
Definition 11 Let P be a program whose least fixpoint of ΓΓ s is T . Then the paraconsistent wellfounded model of P is the pseudo-interpretation
is an interpretation, then P is called non-contradictory, and W F M p (P ) is the well-founded model of P , denoted by W F M (P ).
The paraconsistent well-founded model can by defined iteratively by the transfinite sequence {I α }:
for successor ordinal α + 1 I λ = α<λ I α for limit ordinal λ There exists a smallest ordinal λ 0 such that I λ0 is the least fixpoint of ΓΓ s , and W F M p (P ) = I λ0 ∪ not (H(P ) − Γ s I λ0 ).
Equivalence of argumentation semantics and WFSX
In this section, we will show that the argumentation semantics J u/a and the well-founded model coincide.
That is, the conclusions of justified arguments are exactly the objective literals which are true in the wellfounded model; and those objective literals all of whose arguments are overruled are exactly the literals which are false in the well-founded model. The result holds also for contradictory programs under the paraconsistent well-founded semantics. This is important, because it shows that contradictions in the argumentation semantics are precisely the contradictions under the well-founded semantics, and allows the application of contradiction removal (or avoidance) methods to the argumentation semantics. Because for noncontradictory programs, the well-founded semantics coincides with the paraconsistent well-founded semantics [1] , we obtain as a corollary that argumentation semantics and well-founded semantics coincide for noncontradictory programs.
In order to compare the argumentation semantics with the well-founded semantics, we define the set of literals which are a consequence of the argumentation semantics.
Definition 12 A(P ) = T ∪ not F , where T = {L | there is a justified argument for L} and
The following Proposition shows a precise connection between arguments and consequences of a program P I .
Proposition 10 Let I be a two-valued interpretation.
Proof. See Appendix. 2
Theorem 11
Let P be an extended logic program. Then W F M p (P ) = A(P ).
We show that for all ordinals α, I α = A α , by transfinite induction on α.
Base case α = 0:
Limit ordinal λ: I λ = α<λ I α and A λ = α<λ A α , so by induction hypothesis (I α = A α for all α < λ), I λ = A λ . Now, we show that a literal not L is in the well-founded semantics iff every argument for L is overruled.
Corollary 12 Let P be a non-contradictory program. Then W F M (P ) = A(P ). 
by Theorem 7, we can strengthen this statement to
Proof theory
One of the benefits of relating the argumentation semantics J u/a to WFSX is the existence of an efficient top-down proof procedure for WFSX [1] , which we can use to compute justified arguments in J u/a . On the other hand, dialectical proof theories, based on dialogue trees, have been defined for a variety of argumentation semantics [17, 11, 13] . In this section, we present a sound and complete dialectical proof theory for the least fixpoint argumentation semantics J x/y for any notions of attack x and y. Our presentation closely follows [17] . As a further consequence, we obtain an equivalence of the proof theory for WFSX and the dialectical proof theory for arguments. 
If Player
The first condition states that the players P (Proponent) and O (Opponent) take turns, and P starts. The second condition prevents the proponent from repeating a move. The third and fourth conditions state that both players have to attack the other player's last move, where the opponent is allowed to use the notion of attack x, while the proponent may use y to defend its arguments. We show that the proof theory of x/y-dialogue trees is sound and complete for any notions of attack x and y.
Theorem 13 An argument is provably x/y-justified iff it is x/y-justified.
Proof. "If"-direction. We show by transfinite induction: If A ∈ J α x/y , then there exists a winning x/ydialogue tree of height < α for A.
Base case α = 0: Then there exists no argument B such that (B, A) ∈ x, and so A is a winning x/y-dialogue tree for A of height 0. As a corollary, we can relate the proof theory of WFSX and the u/a-proof theory.
Corollary 14 L is a provably u/a-justified conclusion iff there exists a successful T-tree [2] for L.
Proof. Follows from the fact that u/a-dialogue trees are sound and complete for u/a-justifiability (Theorem 13), that T -trees are sound and complete for WFSX [2] , and that u/a-justifiability and WFSX are equivalent (Theorem 11). 2
Conclusion and Further Work
We have identified various notions of attack for extended logic programs. Based on these notions of attack, we defined notions of acceptability and least fixpoint semantics. These fixpoint semantics were related by establishing a lattice of justified arguments, based on set inclusion. We identified an argumentation semantics J u/a equal to the well-founded semantics for logic programs with explicit negation, W F SX [2] , and established that J Dung ⊆ J P S ⊆ J u/a = W F SX, where J Dung and J P S are the least fixpoint argumentation semantics of Dung [6] and Prakken and Sartor [17] . We have defined a dialectical proof theory for argumentation. For all notions of justified arguments introduced, we prove that the proof theory is sound and complete wrt. the corresponding fixpoint argumentation semantics. In particular, we showthe equivalence of successful T-trees [2] in WFSX to provably u/a justified arguments.
Finally, it remains to be seen whether a variation in the notion of attack yields interesting variations of alternative argumentation semantics for extended logic programs such as preferred extensions or stable extensions [6] . It is also an open question how the hierarchy changes when priorities are added as defined in [17, 20] . 3. and 4. follow immediately from 1. and 2., because I is two-valued.
